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Current state
Over four decades of the development of data protec-
tion laws, the world has witnessed data protection
regimes finally arriving in Africa. At present, there are
eleven African countries out of 54 with comprehensive
data protection legislation. These are Cape Verde
(22 January 2001), Seychelles (24 December 2003),
Burkina Faso (20 April 2004), Mauritius (17 June
2004), Tunisia (27 July 2004), Senegal (15 January
2008), Morocco (18 February 2009), Benin (27 April
2009), Angola (17 June 2011), Gabon (25 September
2011), and Ghana (10 February 2012). At the same
time, in an attempt to harmonize the emerging nation-
al data protection legislation and perhaps to prevent
disruption of flow of personal data, in 2010 the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
adopted a sub-regional framework for its member
states.1 In contrast, in the same year the East African
Community (EAC) adopted data privacy recommenda-
tions for its members.2 While these recommendations
do not stipulate substantive data protection principles
as is the case with most other sub-regional and regional
codes of data protection, they intend to encourage the
member states to align with the international best prac-
tices. The Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the African Union (AU) are still consider-
ing drafts of data privacy instruments.3
As is the case elsewhere, the emerging data protec-
tion regime in Africa is partly influenced by the Euro-
pean Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The
international regime for the transfer of personal data
contained in the Directive 95/46/EC, particularly Arti-
cles 25–26, is most frequently cited by commentators
as one of the forces behind this development.4 Article
25 of the EU Directive restricts the transfer of personal
data to third countries, that is non EU/EEA countries,
unless such countries afford an ‘adequate’ level of data
protection. However, under Article 26 of Directive 95/
46/EC personal data may still be transferred from EU/
EEA to third countries even if such countries fail to
pass the ‘adequacy’ test. Yet, this is only a limited
option as it is a derogation from the main rule in
Article 25 of the Directive.
Undoubtedly, the requirements of Article 25 of Dir-
ective 95/46/EC necessitated the above four African
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(adopted on 7 May 2010 during the 2nd extraordinary meeting of the
Community’s Sectoral Council on Transport, Communications and
Meteorology). Currently EAC has 5 members Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,
Rwanda, and Burundi.
3 SADC Data Protection Model-Law 2012 and AU, Draft African Union
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Cyber Security in Africa, Version 01/01.2011 respectively.
4 See eg LA Bygrave, ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International
Perspective’ (2010) 56 Scandinavian Studies in Law 165–200, at 194.
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countries to seek EU accreditation of their data protec-
tion legislation. The applications for accreditation trig-
gered the assessment of ‘adequacy’. In this context, the
European Commission in 2010 mandated the Research
Centre on IT and Law, University of Namur, Belgium,
to research the level of data protection in the four
African countries; these reports raise questions about
the methodology used to make adequacy decisions, and
its implications for policy making in third countries.
The ‘adequacy’ standard under Directive
95/46/EC
The default rule for the international transfer of per-
sonal data in the Directive is provided in Art 25(1).
This provision states:
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a
third country of personal data which are undergoing pro-
cessing or are intended for processing after transfer may
take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with
the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other pro-
visions of this Directive, the third country in question
ensures an adequate level of protection.
The above provision sets out an ‘adequate level of pro-
tection’ as the basic condition for transfer of personal
data from the EU/EEA to a third country, that is a
country outside the EU/EEA region. However, the Dir-
ective does not define what is meant by ‘adequate level
of protection’. Yet it provides criteria of its assessment.
Article 25(2) sets out these criteria in the following
terms:
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third
country shall be assessed in the light of all the circum-
stances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of
data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be
given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration
of the proposed processing operation or operations, the
country of origin and country of final destination, the
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third
country in question and the professional rules and security
measures which are complied within that country.
What clearly emerges from here is that Article 25 is not
directed so much to the general provisions of the law
in a third country, but to the actual level of protection
which will be accorded in a particular case.5 This view
is cemented by the Article 29 Working Party who says,
‘Article 25 envisages a case by case approach whereby
assessment of adequacy is in relation to individual
transfers or individual categories of transfers.’6 Usually
this assessment lies first with the data exporters and
second with national data protection authorities in the
EU/EEA.7 However, the European Commission is
empowered under Article 25(6) to make general deter-
minations of ‘adequacy’ which are binding on EU/EEA
member states.8 In comparison with data exporters and
national supervisory authorities, the Commission is in
a better position to assess the adequacy of data protec-
tion.9 Such a holistic approach is cost efficient.10 More-
over, it relieves member states, as they do not have to
assess the same cases, and differences between national
assessments can be avoided.11 Similarly, this approach
increases certainty and predictability for data transfer-
ors.12
The effect of the Commission’s positive determin-
ation is to allow free flow of personal data from the EU
member states as well as EEA member countries
(Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) to that third
country without any further safeguard being neces-
sary.13 Currently the European Commission has recog-
nized Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, the
Isle of Man, Jersey, Australia, the Faeroe Islands,
Andorra, Israel, Uruguay, the US Department of Com-
merce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and the transfer
of Air Passenger Name Record to the United States’
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection as providing
adequate protection. However, a negative determin-
ation of adequacy of protection bars the free flow of
information to a third country under Article 25(4) of
5 F Aldhouse, ‘The Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries under EU
Directive 95/46/EC’ (1999) 13(1) International Review of Law Computers
& Technology 75–79, at 76.
6 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Discussion Document: First
Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries—Possible
Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy’, XV D/5020/97/ EN, WP 4,
(adopted on 26 June 1997), 1.
7 LA Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and
Limits (The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002),
81; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 6), at. 2.
8 Bygrave (n 7), supra; note also that the Commission does not make such
decisions on its own but with input from (i) the Data Protection
Working Party(which may deliver a non-binding opinion on the
proposed decision(Art. 30(1)(a) & (b); the Article 31 Committee (whose
approval of the proposed decision is necessary and which may refer the
matter to the Council for final determination (Art. 31(2)); and (iii) the
European Parliament( which is able to check whether the Commission
has properly used its powers), see Bygrave (n 7) fn 317; see also European
Commission., ‘Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection
of personal data in third countries’ ,http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm., accessed 13 August 2012.
9 L Kong, L., ‘Data Protection and Transborder Data Flow in the European
and Global Context’ (2010) 21(2) The European Journal of International
Law (EJIL) 441–56, at 445.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 I Lloyd, Information Technology Law (6th edn, New York: Oxford
University Press), 192.
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Directive 95/46/EC. It is also important to bear in
mind that in all cases where a member state or the
Commission considers that a third country does not
ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data
within the meaning of Article 25(2), such information
is required to be shared across member states. Yet, it is
doubtful if in the former case the notification may have
a binding effect on the other member states.
The second set of rules of international transfer in
the Directive relates to the derogations from the default
rule. These are provided in Article 26. They apply
where a third country does not provide an ‘adequate
level of protection’ to transfer of personal data. Article
26(1) lays down six criteria in the alternative to be
fulfilled before a transfer of personal data to such a
third country can be permitted, that is where (a) the
data subject has given consent unambiguously to the
proposed transfer; or (b) the transfer is necessary to
perform certain contracts between the data subject and
the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual
measures taken in response to the data subject’s
request; or (c) the transfer is necessary for the conclu-
sion or performance of a contract in the interests of
the data subject between the controller and a third
party; or (d) the transfer is necessary or legally required
on important public interest grounds, or for the estab-
lishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims; or (e) the
transfer is necessary to protect the vital interests of the
data subject;14 or (f) the transfer is made from a regis-
ter which according to laws or regulations is intended
to provide information to the public and which is open
to consultation either by the public in general or by
any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest.
Article 26(2) provides another possibility of deroga-
tion. In this case, transfer of personal data may be
authorized by a member state where the data controller
adduces ‘adequate safeguards’ with respect to the pro-
tection of the privacy and fundamental rights and free-
doms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the
corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular
result from appropriate contractual clauses. The ‘ad-
equate safeguards’ referred to in this provision are not
in any way less than the ‘adequate protection’ standard
which consists of a series of basic data protection
principles together with certain conditions necessary to
ensure their effectiveness.15
Also to ensure that these arrangements do not
weaken the level of protection of personal data, a
member state which has so authorized transfer of per-
sonal data in accordance with Article 26(2) is required
to notify the other member states and Commission.16
If upon such notification a member state or the Com-
mission objects to the assessment on justified grounds,
the latter will take appropriate measures and comply
with it.17 Finally, the Commission may decide that
certain standard contractual clauses offer sufficient
safeguards in terms of Art 26(2).
Evaluation of ‘adequacy’ in practice
As pointed out, the European Commission is the insti-
tution mandated to make general decisions over ‘ad-
equate level of protection’ provided for in a third
country. However, in exercise of this power, more often
the Commission receives non-binding opinion from
the Article 29 Working Party. The latter had developed
a methodology of assessment of ‘adequacy’ comprised
in the two sets of documents namely, ‘First Orientation
on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Pos-
sible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy’18—the WP
4—and ‘Working Document on Transfer of Personal
Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26
of the EU Data Protection Directive’19—the WP 12.
However, the latter is more significant and it is currently
regarded in Europe as authoritative.
The WP 12 sets out two levels of assessment of ‘ad-
equate level of data protection’ with regard to inter-
national transfer of personal data to third countries.
The first level of assessment relates to ‘content’ princi-
ples while the second relates to ‘procedural/enforce-
ment’. In principle, the former are modified versions of
the data protection principles contained in the Direct-
ive 95/46/EC while the latter mirror the enforcement
mechanisms envisaged to a large extent under chapter
VI of the Directive.
Content principles
The WP 12 has six main content principles for asses-
sing the ‘adequacy’ level of data protection in a third
country. The first is the purpose limitation principle.
This requires that data should be processed for a specif-
ic purpose and subsequently used or further communi-
14 The expression ‘vital interest’ of the data subject has a restrictive meaning
to mean ‘which is essential for the data subject’s life’, see Directive 95/46/
EC, Recital 31.
15 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on
Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and
26 of the EU Data Protection Directive’, DG XV D/5025/98/WP 12,
(adopted on 24 July 1998), 17.
16 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 26(3).
17 Ibid.
18 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 6).
19 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 15).
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cated only insofar as this is not incompatible with the
purpose of the transfer. The exemptions to this rule
would be those necessary in a democratic society on
one of the grounds listed in Article 12 of the Directive.
The second principle is called the data quality and pro-
portionality principle. It requires that data should be
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Data
should be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in rela-
tion to the purposes for which they are transferred or
further processed. The third principle is the transpar-
ency principle. It states that individuals should be pro-
vided with information as to the purpose of the
processing and the identity of the data controller in the
third country, and other information insofar as this is
necessary to ensure fairness. The only exemptions per-
mitted should be in line with Articles 11(2) and 13 of
the Directive. The fourth principle is called the security
principle. It provides that technical and organizational
security measures should be taken by the data control-
ler that are appropriate to the risks presented by pro-
cessing. Any person acting under the authority of the
data controller, including a processor, must not process
data except on instructions from the controller. The fifth
principle relates to rights of access, rectification, and op-
position. According to this principle, the data subject
should have a right to obtain a copy of all data relating
to him/her that are processed, and a right to rectification
of those data where they are shown to be inaccurate. In
certain situations he/she should also be able to object to
the processing of the data relating to him/her. The only
exemptions to those rights should be in line with Article
13 of the Directive. The sixth principle is about restric-
tions on onward transfers. It provides that further trans-
fers of the personal data by the recipient of the original
data transfer should be permitted only where the second
recipient (ie the recipient of the onward transfer) is also
subject to rules affording an adequate level of protec-
tion. The only exceptions permitted should be in line
with Article 26(1) of the Directive.
Besides the above general principles, WP 12 sets out
by way of examples, additional principles to be applied
in specific types of data processing. These include the
sensitivity principle providing that where ‘sensitive’ cat-
egories of data are involved (those listed under Article
8 of the Directive), additional safeguards should be in
place, such as a requirement that the data subject gives
his/her explicit consent for the processing. The other
principle involves direct marketing. It requires that
where data are transferred for purposes of direct mar-
keting, the data subject should be able to ‘opt out’
from having his/her data used for such purposes at any
stage. Finally, there is the automated individual deci-
sion principle. This principle states that where the
purpose of the transfer is the taking of an automated
decision in the sense of Article 15 of the Directive, the
individual should have the right to know the logic
involved in this decision, and other measures should be
taken to safeguard the individual’s legitimate interest.
Procedural requirements
The WP 12 identifies three main objectives of a data
protection system. The first is the delivery of a good
level of compliance with the rules. A good system is
generally characterized by a high degree of awareness
among data controllers of their obligations, and among
data subjects of their rights and means of exercising
them. The existence of effective and dissuasive sanc-
tions can play an important role in ensuring respect for
rules, as of course can systems of direct verification by
authorities, auditors, or independent data protection
officials. The second objective is the provision of
support and help to individual data subjects in the ex-
ercise of their rights. The individual must be able to
enforce his/her rights rapidly and effectively, and
without prohibitive cost. To do so there must be some
sort of institutional mechanism allowing independent
investigation of complaints. The third objective is the
provision of appropriate redress to the injured party
where rules are not complied with. A good system of
enforcement must comply with the above objectives.
The ‘adequacy’ standard in the four
African jurisdictions
Burkina Faso
On 17 May 2010, CRID released its report on the ana-
lysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data
provided in Burkina Faso.20 Interestingly, it refrained
from giving its conclusion whether Burkina Faso pro-
vides an ‘adequate’ level of protection of personal data.
The CRID’s report partly reads, ‘. . . the authors of the
present report want to insist on the fact that, on the
basis of the content of the report, they are not able to
conclude that the protection of personal data in
Burkina Faso is—or not—adequate. A more clear
vision should be possible after the modification of the
20 CRID, Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data Provided
in Burkina Faso (2010).
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Data Protection Act and the analysis of such modifica-
tion.’21
According to the CRID’s report, the Burkina Faso
Data Protection Act 2004 was in the process of being
modified, hence CRID could not assess the country’s
level of ‘adequacy’ of protection of personal data. Sur-
prisingly, it continued to make an assessment of the en-
forcement mechanism based on the same piece of
legislation it declined to evaluate. Yet, there is no
sound reason advanced by CRID in the report for this
partial assessment. As alluded to, the WP 12 has two
sets of criteria for evaluating the ‘adequacy’ of data
protection in a third country. These are content princi-
ples as well as procedural/enforcement mechanisms. An
‘adequacy’ assessment has to take into account both
sets of these criteria. It is interesting to note that at the
end of its analysis of the enforcement mechanism
under the Data Protection Act, CRID concluded that
the Burkina Faso’s data protection authority is structur-
ally and financially independent.22 However, it noted
that the people’s level of awareness in Burkina Faso is
still not too high.23 Concomitantly, there is no good
level of compliance with the rules.24 Yet, in another dis-
claimer which defeats CRID’s partial assessment, the
report reads, ‘in the opinion of the authors, time
should be given to this (modified) text, in order for it
to be applied and for Burkina Faso to live with it.
Giving adequacy conclusions without the existence of
case law and a higher awareness seems not opportune
as the existence of actual enforcement mechanisms is
an important part of the criteria to meet before being
possibly considered as a country offering an adequate
protection in the sense of article 25 of the European
Directive 95/46.’25 Arguably, it was less beneficial for
CRID to carry out a partial assessment when it was not
sure if the provisions assessed would not be modified
by a new law. Moreover, as it correctly stated, sufficient
time is required to observe the actual practice of the
modified Act, hence CRID’s assessment was premature.
Mauritius
On 30 April 2010 CRID released its final report on the
analysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data
provided in Mauritius.26 The overall outcome of this
assessment is presented in four aspects. First, the
adequacy conclusion with respect to the public sector is
that the Mauritian data protection system is far from
being considered to fully comply with the WP 12 re-
quirement. This is largely due to the broad range of its
exemption regime with no relevant justification. The
report identifies, for example, the exemption of ‘infor-
mation available to the public’ as well as weaknesses as
regards ‘criminal and taxation’ and ‘regulatory activ-
ities’ to be the main areas of concern. At the same time
the CRID noted that some activities have been
exempted from the application of the basic principles
of data processing yet remained subject to the provi-
sions of the Act dealing with the same principles.
Second, the adequacy conclusion with respect to the
private sector is that the Data Protection Act 2004
affords a wider protection. Nevertheless, there are lim-
itations on the exemption of the data subject’s right of
access when the processing is in connection with em-
ployment or in matter of ‘social work’. Moreover, there
are no restrictions in the matter of automated individ-
ual decisions.
Third, as for the enforcement mechanisms, the issue
of registration procedure is considered to be problem-
atic since it is burdensome. Moreover, there is little
guarantee that data subjects might exercise their rights
effectively and without prohibitive costs.
The fourth conclusion is that the Mauritian Data
Protection Act contains (too) many examples of poor
drafting and contradictions. As a result many aspects
are difficult to understand—sometimes even have no
sense—or are difficult—or even impossible—to apply.
The CRID’s report emphasizes that the poor drafting
aspect should not be underestimated at the time of
assessing the adequacy of the data protection system in
Mauritius.
The above adequacy conclusions have taken into
account specific issues. In particular, the CRID was
concerned with the exception to the rule ‘information
available to the public’ which appears dominantly in
the Act. This rule is too broad and without any relevant
justification. As a result it has undermined almost all
the content principles in the WP 12. Yet, interestingly
the CRID observes that with respect to ‘the exemption
to the right of access of data subject in the health and
social work field, such exemption though not compli-
ant with the WP 12 requirements, is mostly problematic
at national level, and does not raise much issue with
respect to European personal data protection’.27 This
21 Ibid, at 54.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 CRID, Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data Provided
in Mauritius (2010).
27 Ibid, at 102.
International Data Privacy Law, 2013, Vol. 3, No. 146 ARTICLE
 by guest on A
pril 13, 2013
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
suggests that it is the protection of European residents’
interests that matters most in the assessment of ‘ad-
equacy’, rather than the interests of residents of a third
country.
With respect to the international transfer of personal
data, CRID found that such regime is also problematic.
The adequacy issue here is that every transfer of per-
sonal data outside Mauritius requires the authorization
of the data protection commissioner. This is regardless
of whether such country affords an adequate level of
protection hence making the regime of international
transfer highly restrictive.
Similarly, at the time of assessment there was no
case law or any decisions decided on the basis of the
Data Protection Act. Accordingly, it was difficult for
the CRID to have a thorough picture of how the Act
functions in practice.
The rest of the provisions of the Mauritian Data
Protection Act were found to be compliant with the
WP 12. However, taken in their totality, such provi-
sions could still not warrant an adequacy clearance.
Tunisia
On 22 December 2010 CRID released its final report
on the analysis of the adequacy of protection of per-
sonal data provided in Tunisia.28 The overall outcome
of this assessment states in part, ‘ . . . in our exclusive
personal view, the Tunisian regime regarding the pro-
tection of personal data is to be considered inadequate,
at the present time, and on the basis of our compre-
hension of the Act in force.’29
In arriving at the above conclusion, CRID found a
number of shortcomings in the whole of the Tunisian
data protection system. One such shortcoming rests
upon the territorial scope of the Data Protection Act
2004. It found that the Tunisian Act does not provide
for a specific provision on the territorial scope of the
law. However, section 22 of the Act clearly states that
the physical person or the representative of the legal
person wishing to perform personal data processing
and their agents must have Tunisian nationality, have a
residence in Tunisia, and have a blank criminal record.
According to this provision, a foreign person or legal
entity will neither be a controller or a processor of per-
sonal data in Tunisia, nor an employee or agent of a
controller or processor of such data without violating
the Act.30 At the same time, even a Tunisian citizen
who does not have his/her residence in Tunisia shall
not be able to be involved in the processing of personal
data performed in Tunisia, either as a controller, a
processor, or an agent.31 The CRID emphasizes that
section 22 of the Tunisian Data Protection Act is prob-
lematic as it restricts foreign persons or companies on
the Tunisian territory while at the same time Tunisia is
ranking highly as an important offshore destination.32
Moreover, the Tunisian Data Protection Act has an
extensive derogatory regime. According to CRID, a
large number of provisions of the Act are not applic-
able to public authorities. Section 53 of the Act is cited
as the most problematic one as it leads to many exemp-
tions in the Act.33
Somewhat related to the above, the CRID found that
the derogative regime in the Tunisian Act undermines
significantly the requirement of transparency. Often
data subjects are not aware of the existence of data pro-
cessing by public authorities. Similarly, when authoriza-
tion by the data protection authority is required for
certain types of processing (eg data relating to health or
video surveillance purposes), the Act does not provide
for an obligation of informing of the data subject,
raising an issue of transparency in those cases.34
The data subject’s right of access with regard to the
processing carried out by the public persons is highly
compromised. According to CRID, public persons are
exempted from providing a right of access in some
cases which might go beyond the cases listed in Article
13 of the Directive.35
Another problematic area is on the Tunisian inter-
national onward transfer regime. The CRID found the
regime to be highly restrictive. This is because it requires
authorization of the data protection authority for every
transfer of personal data outside Tunisia. There is no ex-
ception to this rule even to countries possessing an ad-
equate level of protection of personal data.
With regard to sensitive data, the general prohibition
to process personal data related to criminal offences is
held to be unrealistic and a dead letter since profes-
sionals (eg lawyers, bailiffs, etc.) process these data as
part of their activities. Similarly, CRID found that the
absence of any guarantees as to the processing of sensi-
tive data by public persons is wholly unsatisfactory.
Moreover, Tunisia has neither a regulation nor any
provision in the Data Protection Act on the issue of
28 CRID, Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data Provided
in Tunisia (2010).
29 Ibid, at 123.
30 Ibid, at 33.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, at 34 & 63.
33 Ibid, at 27–31.
34 Ibid, at 115.
35 Ibid, at 117.
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automated individual decision. Due to this, CRID con-
cludes that the Tunisian regime of data protection fails
to pass the adequacy requirement to that extent.
The procedural/enforcement mechanisms have their
shortcomings too. In particular, the CRID is concerned
with the independence of the Tunisian data protection
authority. Members of the authority drawn from the
public sector lack guarantees. Moreover, the authority
financially and structurally is linked to the Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights. Similarly, the exemptions
on public persons have constrained the support and
help to individual data subjects.
There are two other considerations which the CRID
took into account in its findings. First, the Tunisian
data protection authority was only recently established.
At the time of assessment it had not yet issued any
regulatory document such as recommendations, guide-
lines, decisions, etc. Second, for the same reason, there
were no decided cases in relation to the application of
the Act hence it was difficult to assess the application
of the law in practice. Moreover, the interpretation of
the law has been made somewhat difficult due to poor
drafting of the Act in several places.
Keeping aside the shortcomings discussed above, the
rest of the provisions of the Tunisian Data Protection
Act were found to be compliant with the WP 12. Yet,
when considered together these provisions do not con-
stitute an adequate level of protection of personal data.
Morocco
On 13 August 2010 CRID released its final report on the
analysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data
provided in Morocco.36 The CRID holds that the issue of
protection of personal data in Morocco is relatively new.
The legislation on data protection was adopted largely to
fill the legal vacuum in this area for the purposes of off-
shoring activities in Morocco. Due to this, and also the
fact that the Moroccan data protection authority officially
started to function on 2 September 2010, it was prema-
ture for CRID to make a general conclusion on whether
the Moroccan data protection system provides an
adequate or inadequate level of protection.
However, a theoretical evaluation of the Moroccan
data protection legislation revealed a number of short-
comings. As observed by one of the authors of the
CRID’s report for Morocco, data concerning sex life are
not considered as sensitive, though the definition of
‘sensitive data’ closely follows the European one.37 This
is due to the Muslim character of the Moroccan
State.38 However, it is surprising the Legislator has
recognized ‘philosophical and religious beliefs’ as sensi-
tive data, while the processing of this type of data
occurs regularly in a variety of situations in Morocco.39
Although the principle of transparency in the Mo-
roccan data protection legislation is held to be compli-
ant with the WP 12, adequacy issues have been raised
with respect to exceptions to the disclosure require-
ment of processing in the context of ‘open networks’.
First, the concept of ‘open networks’ is not defined in
the Moroccan Act to help ascertain the scope of exemp-
tion. Second, the law imposes upon data controllers the
duty to inform data subjects about collection of their
personal data in ‘open networks’ unless the latter
already know that such data would circulate without
security guarantee or may be used by unauthorized
third parties. The CRID finds that the formulation of
this provision is awkward. Similarly the consultant
noted that it is difficult to distinguish ‘a person who
already knows’ and ‘a person who does not know’ in
the so called ‘open networks’. The CRID is also con-
cerned by the formulation of Morocco’s provision on
transparency for being contradictory. This is due to the
fact that it authorizes a data controller to collect per-
sonal data and at the same time it does not impose a
duty upon him to inform when he knows that the in-
formation collected will be used by third parties whom
the Act itself calls unauthorized parties.
Likewise the CRID found that contrary to the Euro-
pean data protection Directive 95/46/EC which places
consent on the same level as the other legitimate
grounds for processing personal data, the Moroccan
Act singles out consent as the only ground for process-
ing. However, it puts the other grounds in an inferior
position leading to restriction.
The adequacy of the international transfer of person-
al data is similarly at issue. The reason is that it always
requires the approval of the data protection commis-
sioner. This is irrespective of whether the foreign
country provides an adequate level of protection of
personal data.
The rest of the provisions of the Moroccan data
protection law were found to be compliant with the
WP 12. However, these provisions could not satisfy the
adequacy clearance criteria.
36 CRID, Analyse du Niveau d’Adequation du Systeme de Protection des
Donnees dans le Royaume du Maroc (2010).
37 C Gayrel, ‘Data Protection in the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco’
(2012) 115 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 18–20, at 20.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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Flawed determinations?
Although the Article 29 Working Party has attempted to
lay down legally non-binding rules for assessment of
‘adequate level of data protection’ in third countries,
specifically those found in WP 4 and WP 12, in practice
it has taken into account extraneous latent considera-
tions not envisaged by the Directive itself. For example,
the Article 29 Working Party commissioners have con-
sidered and hence taken on board political considera-
tions in the assessment. In their view ‘some third
countries might come to see the absence of a finding
that they provided adequacy protection as politically
provocative or at least discriminatory, in that the
absence of a finding is as likely to be the result of their
case not having been examined as of a judgment on
their data protection system.’40 Performing the adequate
assessment on these fears has rendered ‘political consid-
erations an obstacle for a sound evaluation, as not
placing a country on the white list is similar to blacklist-
ing it’.41 Since CRID deployed the PW 12 in its analyses,
it is doubtful if it was able to overcome these fears.
However, in mitigating the chances of an occurrence
of diplomatic and political tensions with third coun-
tries, the EU has in most cases awaited requests from
third countries to initiate the process of accreditation.42
Concomitantly where at first instance the Commission
finds problems with the data protection regulations
and practices in a third country, it normally engages
such countries and facilitates improvement of their reg-
ulations and practices until a required level is reached.
In that way the Article 29 Working Party more often
adopts its official opinion on the level of adequacy
after the third countries have addressed a number of
areas of concern. Because of this strategy, most of its
adopted opinions have had favourable outcome on
third countries except the US Safe Harbor Agreement
and the Passenger Name Records.
At the same time, where the Article 29 Working
Party had a negative opinion as to the ‘adequate level
of data protection’ in a third country, it used ‘neutral’
language in its opinion to avoid passing a direct ‘verdict’
only expressing its dissatisfaction by drawing the atten-
tion of the Commission to take into account key areas
of concerns when making its decision.43 However in
those cases where an expressed negative opinion is
issued, the Article 29 Working Party has never made it
public. In this connection Professor Graham Greenleaf
argues that, ‘there could be significantly more adequacy
findings outside Europe if the EU was more pro-active
and more transparent about its processes. Where the EU
has made positive adequacy decision it has publicized
the reasons, but where it has considered “applications”
from other countries but concluded that their protec-
tions were not yet adequate, it has not generally publi-
cized the reasons for these negative conclusions. There
has therefore been much less information available
about what does and what does not constitute “ad-
equacy” than is desirable.’44
The certification approach is different on some occa-
sions where external consultants had been hired by the
Commission to undertake an analysis of the adequacy
of data protection in a third country. Here, more direct
language, in which a ‘spade is called by its name’, has
been used in those instances of negative findings. This
is so, for instance, with the conclusive view of the con-
sultant (CRID) in the case of Tunisia. Perhaps because
of this, cases of negative outcome reports on adequacy
have either been treated as confidential, allegedly on
account of contractual confidentiality clauses between
the consultant and the Commission,45 but in reality to
prevent the so called ‘political provocation’ which the
Article 29 Working Party has openly admitted in its
guidelines for assessing the level of adequacy of data pro-
tection in third countries is a potential risk to diplomatic
relations.46 Yet only rarely have such reports been made
public.47 However, this point need not be exaggerated.
In some instances (for instance Burkina Faso, Mauritius,
and Morocco) the consultant has used more evasive
40 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 15), at 27; see also Kong (n 9).
41 P Blume, ‘Transborder Data Flow: Is there a solution in sight?’ (2000)
International Journal of Law and International Technology 65–86, at 70.
42 See eg N Ringou, ‘Data Protection: European Adequacy Procedure’,
presentation made in ‘Twinning Project IS/2007/ENPAP/JH/01:
Strengthening Data Protection in Israel’ 30 September 2009, Israel,
(23 slides, at slide no.17), ,http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/
A31C13F2-3554-4086-929C- 2CFF6D31462C/21169/
DataProtectionIsrael.pdf . , accessed 13 August 2012.
43 This was the case, for example, with the determination of ‘adequacy’ of
the Canadian Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 2000.
44 G Greenleaf, ‘Do not dismiss “Adequacy”: European Standards
entrenched’ (2011) 114 Privacy Laws & Business International Report
16–18, at 16–17.
45 This was confirmed to the author of this article by one of the authors of
the CRID’s reports on 10 January 2012 when the former requested from
the latter those reports. The author received similar response from the
Commissioner of Data Protection in Mauritius when he requested
the same report. However, she promised to send the second report to the
author later suggesting that such report may have a favourable assessment
from EU authorities.
46 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 15), at 27.
47 See eg CRID, ‘Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data
provided in Tunisia-Final Report’ (2010), ,http://alexandrie.droit.fundp.
ac.be/GEIDEFile/6544.pdf?Archive=192619191089&File=6544_pdf.,
accessed 13 August 2012 and CRID, ‘First Analysis of the Personal Data
Protection in India-Final Report’ (2005) ,http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/privacy/docs/studies/final_report_india_en.pdf., accessed
13 August 2012.
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language but with the same effect of negative determin-
ation. Still those reports have been kept confidential.
The other extraneous criterion considered by the
Article 29 Working Party in its opinion is the economic
importance of a third country to Europe and concomi-
tantly the amount of data of Europeans likely to be
transferred there. This can be well demonstrated by the
recent clearance of New Zealand by the Article 29
Working Party as providing an adequate level of data
protection despite several weaknesses in New Zealand’s
data protection regime. It is evident that the clearance
was prompted by ‘New Zealand’s relative geographical
isolation; the limited EU-sourced data likely to be
transferred to New Zealand (which minimizes the
problem of onward transfers); and the reciprocal lack
of direct marketing into the EU that could be expected
from NZ’.48 It can thus be generally concluded ‘that the
standard of adequacy is in inverse proportion to prox-
imity, provided that “proximity” is considered to
include the economic and social, not only the geo-
graphical’.49 Because the four African jurisdictions have
been highly ranked as off-shore destinations for foreign
companies, it is doubtful if the CRID was not influ-
enced by such reasons in its assessment.
Similarly, it is significant to note that the Article 29
Working Party has taken into consideration the inter-
ests of EU citizens at the expense of those in the third
country when assessing the adequacy of the data pro-
tection system. Accordingly ‘it is the effect of a third
party’s laws on EU citizens that counts toward ad-
equacy, not the effect on the country’s own citizens’.50
The four CRID reports reflect this view in many places
particularly on issues concerning the territorial scope
of the legislation, onward transfer, and automated indi-
vidual decision. It is important to note that on one
occasion in its assessment of the Mauritian Data Pro-
tection Act, the CRID pointed out that although the
exemption with respect to the right of access of the
data subject in the health and social work field is not
compliant with WP 12, that would be problematic at
national level, but does not raise much issue with
respect to European personal data protection. This is a
clear instance where the effect of a third party’s laws on
EU citizens takes precedence.
Despite their shortcomings, the CRID’s assessments
of the ‘adequacy’ of data protection in the four African
jurisdictions raise important questions for the future
development of data protection law in Africa. First, the
adoption of data protection law in Africa should not be
considered a mere exercise of ‘cut and paste’ of EU law
or that of its members. Sufficient debates, discussions,
and public consultations must be engaged before such
laws are adopted. The South African path is commend-
able, although it is now taking too long (over 10
years). Second, but somewhat connected to the first
point, the drafting of data protection legislation should
engage experts. This should not only engage the ordin-
ary draftsmanship departments of the governments,
but also experts in the area of data protection law.
Third, African governments should not only adopt data
privacy legislation for the purposes of attracting foreign
investments but also to help their people against
unauthorized processing of personal data. Fourth, the
CRID’s assessments clearly highlight that an adequacy
assessment rigorously takes into account how the laws,
regulations, guidelines, codes of practice, etc. function
in practice. This means that African jurisdictions
should not pass a law today and rush for EU accredit-
ation tomorrow. Sufficient time has to pass to allow
them to put the law in practice. Early application for
EU accreditation, even before the law becomes oper-
ational or has not generated any authoritative inter-
pretation, is likely to fail.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ips031
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48 G Greenleaf and LA Bygrave, ‘Note entirely adequate but far away:
Lessons from how Europe sees New Zealand data protection’ (2011) 111
Privacy Laws & Business International Report 8–9, at 9.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
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